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Introduction
Are the social domains of kinship and business on balance
complementary or contradictory? Do ventures that invest heavily in
both – conventionally referred to as “family firms” - bear a net gain or
net loss? We are scarcely the first to raise these questions. How then
will we try to contribute to an answer? We try this in five ways, all of
them based on previous literature. First, we develop the dichotomy of
kinship and business by taking seriously the metaphor of yin and yang,
merging it with the anthropological constructs of structural domains
such as “domestic” and “public.” This metaphor proves to shed light on
the relevant literature. Second, we provide a qualitative survey of the
costs and benefits of kinship in business. Third, we summarize the
empirical work that addresses the performance outcomes from family
involvement. Fourth, we consider the practitioner implications of these
studies. Finally, we ask if scholars are as yet in a position to answer
these questions.
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The Structural Domains of Kinship and Business
Let us imagine two domains, first the domain of kinship and
marriage, second the domain of commerce and economy. Following
Fortes (1969: 97), by “domain” we mean a sector of social life with a
distinctive “range of social relations, customs, norms, [and] statuses…
unified by the stamp of distinctive functional features”. Based on
anthropological kinship theory (e.g., Bloch, 1973; Fortes, 1969; Jones,
2005) we generate a set of correlative pairs, which (following Jones,
2005) we call Structural Dualism One:

Domain A

Domain B

Kinship

Business

Domestic

Politico-jural

Private

Public

Nature

Culture

Female

Male

Long-term generalized reciprocity

Short-term balanced reciprocity

The yin-yang metaphor
Unsurprisingly this sort of dualism has generated controversy,
particularly among feminist scholars (Rotman, 2006, Smith, 2009). As
these critics have documented, the extent to which this dualism has
been accepted is historically contingent (Comaroff, 1987; di Leonardo,
1987; Jones, 2005). Nonetheless, binary thinking along these lines
has had a long history in many cultures. The most elaborated version
of this thinking is the ancient Chinese yin-yang cosmology. In this
cosmology, one side (our Domain A) is yin (陰) and the other (our
Domain B) is yang (陽), terms that in this cosmology “subsume” all
other “complementary” pairs”(Allen, 1997: 59). Following Cheng
(2008) and Graham (1989), we take some of the fundamental pairs
within this extensive set of paradigms to generate Structural Dualism
Two:
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Domain A

Domain B

Yin

Yang

Darkness

Sunlight

Cold

Heat

Earth

Heaven

Passivity

Action

Softness

Strength

Female

Male

Within this worldview, the right or yang side is considered
“dominant” (Cheng, 2008: 223). Therefore, as with Dualism One, this
set lends itself readily to sexist, and indeed “feudal,” ideology (Cheng,
2008: 224; Li, 2000: 34-36; Jones, 2005). Greenhalgh (1994)
provides an excellent example of the use of this ideology by patriarchs
of family firms. However, it is not only females – and the young – who
can be marginalized by these dichotomies, so also can family business
itself. After all, family firms are precisely those organizations that
invest energy and derive resources substantially in both domains.
Therefore, we find in the family firm literature sufficient material to
derive a dualism based on the real or imagined differences in
managerial philosophy. Following Benedict (1968), Jones (2005), and
Stewart (2003; 2008) we derive Structural Dualism Three:

Domain A (yin)

Domain B (yang)

Family firms

Non-family firms

Amateurism

Professionalism

Informality

Formality

Private and secret

Public and open

Functional diffuseness

Functional specificity
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Ascription
Nurturance and indulgence

Achievement
Competition

Consumption

Production

Subjectivity

Objectivity

This dualism is, like the others, ideologically charged and
potentially most misleading. Clearly, this dualism rests on the first,
that of kinship and business (if not also, in China, on yin and yang).
Therefore, its underlying assumptions tend to be those of Structural
Dualism One, not least of which is the great divide between
“ascription” (actors playing their given roles) and “achievement”
(agents actively strategizing) within pre-capitalist and capitalist
societies respectively. The fact that these assumptions have long been
shown to be ethnographically misleading (Finnegan, 1970; Goody,
1996; Saberwal, 1998; Wallman, 1975) has not much altered their
enduring influence. For a scathing critique of such dualisms as
achievement and ascription as merely “words, treated as logical
contradictions,” see Faris (1953: 105). Moreover, the pairs that are
culturally salient, and their relative valuations, vary throughout space
and time. For example, Japanese oppositions such as uchi (inside) and
soto (outside) are uniquely elaborated in that culture (Borovoy, 2005).
Moreover, the valuations placed upon each side also vary. Not
everyone worships the workaholic Wall Street warrior. To the contrary,
in the early decades of the rise of the British middle class, many men
viewed their business careers as necessary antecedents to time better
spent on domestic, religious, and cultural pursuits (Davidoff and Hall,
1987; Creed, 2000 gives further examples). Finally, these dichotomies
are not purely opposites, and tend to be fluid if not always overtly
contested (Rotman, 2006; see generally Comaroff, 1987).
What then remains of value in the yin-yang metaphor? For a
start, yin-yang self- advertises as a metaphor with no concrete
referent; it simply references the dichotomies we associate, rightly or
wrongly, with on the one hand kinship and family businesses (FBs) and
on the other hand commerce and non-family businesses (NFBs). For
this reason we use the Chinese terms, un-translated; these are in fact
“untranslatable” (Oshima, 1983: 65). Moreover, the yin- yang
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metaphor raises our central questions in this essay. “Throughout the
chain [yang] is superior to [yin] but the two are mutually dependent.
China tends to treat opposites as complementary, the West as
conflicting” (Graham, 1989: 331). Although the orthodox strain of
Chinese classical scholarship has regarded yin and yang as
“dynamically harmonious” and not “antagonistic”, they have also been
seen as “not entirely balanced” (Cheng, 2008: 219, 231). The yinyang metaphor therefore leaves open the question of the relationship
between the two sides. More strongly, it poses that question itself. In
its earliest known form, yin and yang referred to the “mutually
destructive” forces of water and fire (Allen, 1997: 58). Only with the
elaboration of yin-yang cosmology around 250 B.C. did they come to
represent “the complementary forces that imbue and define all life” (as
above). The metaphor therefore raises the central question for family
firms, are kinship and business primarily complementary or
contradictory?
Moreover, the yin-yang metaphor is not merely a literary
device. By forcing the terms into binary opposites it may create
something of a caricature, but by the same token it draws in sharp
relief the potential for considerable discrepancies of evaluation across
these domains. Here we must assume that to some extent actual
behavior regarding roles of kinship and of business bears some
resemblance to Dualism One, if not of Two and Three. Certainly it is
not uncommon for the domains of business and kinship to be culturally
considered as “very different in their essence” (De Lima, 2000: 152).
An example from the ethnographic record is a young man who, in the
yin domain, is a “pet” child, but in the yang an incompetent successor
(Hamabata, 1990: 43; Ram & Holliday, 1993). This is an example in
which the mixing of yin and yang represents a cost born by the
business. Managing a family firm is at its heart an effort to reconcile
such dichotomies (Colli, 2003: 67; Jones, 2005; Stewart, 2003).
Empirical studies of family firm performance give evidence to the
double-edged sword of the mixture. Literature reviews in these
studies adopt a stance of “on one hand, on the other hand”; the family
firm has benefits like lower paid workers; it has costs like employees
(not all of them kin) with senses of entitlement.
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Structural domains and entrepreneurship
The concept of structural domains also resonates with the
foundational theory of entrepreneurship within anthropology. First,
however, we must make an ethnographic assumption: that in many
cultures, kinship is at least a widely adopted idiom that reflects the
deepest moral values of the culture (Bloch, 1973; Peletz 2001; Song,
1999: 82-83; Steadman, Palmer & Tilley, 1996; Stewart, 1990). If so,
it may be that these domains are in practice – on the ground - quite
distinct, such that the same resources, say, personal networks or
potential employees, are discrepantly valued in each, such that a
classic form of entrepreneurial opportunity arises. As Barth argued in
his seminal paper, “economic spheres in Darfur,” “entrepreneurs will
direct their activity pre-eminently towards those points of an economic
system where the discrepancies of evaluation are the greatest, and will
attempt to create bridging transactions” (Barth, 1967: 171; Stewart,
1990; 2003).
An example of higher valuation than in the yin world than the
yang: a modestly profitable venture, not very interesting in financial
terms, but an opportunity for reuniting scattered kin (Bruun, 1993:
32; Greenhalgh, 1994). An example of higher valuation in the yang
world than the yin: the ability to keep a confidence for many years
(Benedict, 1968; Marcus with Hall, 1992: Chap. 4). Discretion is
useful with clandestine bedroom arrangements but materially more
useful with clandestine boardroom agreements. Marcus (1992: 131)
argued that kinship networks have a unique capacity to provide
linkages, “to make secret deals, … to pull together resources from
across various social and institutional spheres to pursue a single aim…
[because] they integrate functions and activities that specialized
institutional orders differentiate and fragment.” For example, for
families that own small businesses, kinship is the source of the
“synthesis” needed to patch together “multiple incomes, from multiple
sources, with multiple fallback positions” (Creed, 2000: 343).

Yin and yang in scholarly research
Another suggestion that these dichotomies refer to matters “in
the real world” can be found in the scholarly division of labor. Stewart
(2008) examined the structure of topical attention (that is, the
network amongst topics) for 14 fields of study, comparing their
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attention to topics along the “familial” and “commercial” poles. He
found that some fields clustered together along the familial pole, some
along the commercial pole, and some were rather more balanced in
coverage. As represented by their foregrounded topics (in abstracts of
articles) strategy, economics, marketing and finance clustered tightly
together around the commercial pole, with entrepreneurship so highly
skewed in that direction as to be less highly correlated. Anthropology,
family and marital therapy, history, law, and sociology clustered tightly
around the familial pole, with psychology alone very highly correlated
with family and marital therapy.
Business school scholars, therefore, organize their efforts as if
they subscribe to the concepts of structural domains. Their division of
labor reflects a skewing to either the yin or the yang, with few fields of
study well balanced between the two.1 To the extent that a field
considers a given yin topic (such as emotions), it is more inclined to
consider others (such as secrecy), and less inclined to consider the
yang topics (such as investments or arbitrage). The reverse is also
true. To date, qualitative overviews of the costs and benefits of kinship
in firms have been based on yin-oriented scholarship: from
anthropology (Stewart, 2003), Chinese history (Whyte, 1996), and
family studies (Mattessich & Hill, 1976). Empirical research on family
firm performance has been conducted instead in yang-oriented fields
such as economics, finance and strategy. Therefore, we turn next to a
qualitative overview based on this sort of scholarship, followed by a
summary of the findings about performance.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Kinship in
Business
Family businesses are among the oldest forms of business
organization, with the earliest records dating back at least to 1900
BCE (Goody, 1996: 138). Some currently active family firms have
extremely long histories, especially in the context of the turbulent
starting, stopping and restructuring of firms of all types. The first
recorded family business that continued into the modern era was
1

Family business, as reflected by the Family Business Review, was found to be fairly well
balanced, as was public administration and policy. Fields of study tended to converge more in full
texts coverage of topics, with entrepreneurship and strategy remaining the most skewed to the
commercial and family and marital therapy, and psychology, the most skewed to the familial.
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Kongo Jumi, started in Japan in 578 A.D and lasting through 40
generations before its liquidation in 2006. Surviving, very old family
firms include Hoshi Ryokan (Japan, est. 718), the Chateau de Goulaine
vineyard (France, est. 1,000) and the Marinelli foundry (Italy, est.
1339). By North American standards, very old family firms include
Shirley Plantation (est. 1613), Zildjian (est. 1623, albeit in
Constantinople before moving to the U.S. in1929), Laird and Company
(U.S.A., est. 1780), and Molson’s Brewery (Canada, est. 1786)
(Anonymous, 2007). In some countries, such as Germany, firms often
remain in the control of the same family for several generations
(Erhardt, Nowak, & Weber, 2005; see generally Church, 1993).
Family businesses have been and remain important despite
having a particularly complex form of business organization (Danes et
al.,2002; Haddadj, 2003; Nordqvist, Hall, & Melin, 2009; Ram &
Holliday, 1993; Schwass, 2005). That is because of the integration and
interrelationships between the business organization, its structure and
the family with its hierarchy. In the face of this complexity, the family
business form has proven resilient; it is not a passing phase of
development (Colli, 2003; Church, 1993). “By far the dominant form
of controlling ownership in the world is… by families” (La Porta, Lopezde-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999: 496). Such ownership is important even
amongst U.S. public firms. For example, approximately one-third of
the Standard and Poor’s 500 firms have founding family members still
in the management. This means that, in some way, the family
continues some influence on the operation and outcomes of these
major business organizations. Additionally, family business is popular
all over the world. For example, over 50 percent of the firms in Asia
and almost 45 percent of the firms in Europe are controlled by families
(Claessens, DjanKoo & Lang, 2000; Faccio & Lang, 2002). Also,
business groups are a major form of business operations in Latin
America and they are commonly family-controlled as well (Luo &
Chung, 2005). The lengthy history and ubiquity of family firms
suggests that they must enjoy some advantages over other forms of
business organization and ownership.

Advantages of Kinship in Business
The writings on the performance effects of family involvement
cite four main areas in which family involvement generates an
advantage: (1) internal coordination, (2) monitoring of agents, (3)
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long-term commitment, and (4) external relationships. One suggested
reason for the first of these advantages, better internal coordination, is
lower costs for transactions between internal units and between
individuals and boundary spanners within the organization (Khanna &
Palepu, 2000). This is because family business encourages information
dissemination, more so than other forms of organization. Thus, when
disputes arise, the conflict is usually resolved in a more efficient
manner with fewer negative outcomes because of the commitment to
the organization and the personal incentives to ensure that the firm is
successful. In short, information is shared because of greater trust and
family norms that encourage conciliation (Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, &
Very, 2007; Peng, 2004).
Second, the traditional view is that family business
organizations typically have lower agency costs (compare Schulze et
al., 2001). One reason is that family members are concerned about
the family, their family’s reputation and about the business owned by
the family. There is such an integration of the family business and the
family as a unit that family members are much less likely to take
actions that are in their own self-interest but not in the interest of the
family business or the family. Moreover, controlling families “have
strong incentives to monitor carefully” any hired managers, and they
may have idiosyncratic knowledge that facilitates their controls
(Andres, 2008: 433; also Saito, 2008).
The third advantage claimed for family firms stem from a longterm commitment to the enterprise. The close integration of family
and firm generates a strong socio-emotional endowment or
commitment to the family business (Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, NunezNickel, Jacobson & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007). Family members are
concerned about the reputation of the business because it reflects on
the family name. Furthermore, if the family business succeeds, it
contributes to the well being, financially and otherwise of the family as
well as to the family members’ standing in the community. As a result,
firms with long-term family control are regarded as less likely than
other firms to default on their obligations, and consequently enjoy a
lower cost of debt (Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2003).
Sirmon and Hitt (2003) argued that family businesses often
have more patient capital and survivability capital. This means that the
family and individual family members are more willing to risk their
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personal capital for a longer period of time to ensure that the success
of their business. Additionally, even more distant family members may
be willing to provide extra financial capital when the business is under
financial duress, such as in the global economic crisis experienced in
2009. Thus, family businesses often have access to special types of
capital through family members and, therefore, may not have to seek
funds from independent external sources. External sources of capital
often place restrictions on the use of the capital, require shorter-term
repayments, and charge higher rates of interest. As a result, family
businesses often are able to take a longer-term view and act in ways
that display greater strategic persistence (Anderson & Reeb, 2003).
Thus, family businesses may be able to stay with a strategy longer to
ensure that it will be successful rather than trying to take actions in
the short-term that satisfy external constituents.
This independence of action allows family firms to take actions,
such as R&D investments, that may generate their returns only in the
longer term (Allouche et al., 2008). Increasing investments in R&D
should provide greater innovations and, thus, allow the firm to
introduce new and highly competitive products into the marketplace.
Furthermore, if firms enter international markets effectively (that is,
they choose the appropriate markets to enter and enter in ways that
allow them to be successful), internationalization should allow the firm
to enhance its economies of scale and scope (Hitt, Hoskisson & Kim,
1997).
Finally, a family builds up external social capital over time and
passes it down to successor generations. Such social capital over time
is less assured in a typical business organization as much social capital
is often tied to the individual rather than the organization as such.
There may be more continuity of membership in family firms than in
non-family firms. Family businesses may also display more altruistic
actions to employees and to the external community they serve than
other forms of business organizations. Chrisman, Chua and
Kellermanns (2009: 743) found support for their hypothesis that
family firms develop better “long-term stable relationships that depend
on external collaboration,” with the result that family firms gain a
significantly greater performance benefit from external social capital
than do non- family firms.
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Disadvantages of Kinship in Business
Whereas this literature proposes four advantages of family firm,
six disadvantages are noted. Moreover, these disadvantages are cited
more frequently than the advantages. This skewing towards the costs
not benefits contrasts with the more sanguine overviews noted above
in anthropology, Chinese history and family studies. Perhaps these
fields are more attuned to the yin domain, which provides “softer”
benefits that are hard to quantify. Perhaps, of course, this more yangoriented literature is simply more realistic. Moreover, all six
disadvantages should be interpreted in the context of entrenched
family control, which is non uncommon but not universal in family
firms. In any case, the six disadvantages are (1) management that is
less entrepreneurial and less flexible, (2) agency conflicts between
controlling and minority owners, (3) weaker governance that tolerates
mediocre management, (4) a bias towards heirs regardless of
capabilities and poor preparation of successors due to indulgence
(parental altruism), (5) limitations in their mobilization of non-family
talent, and (6) higher levels of conflict.
The first disadvantage is that family businesses may be
reluctant to take risks. For example, prior research has found that
family businesses are often cautious about investing in higher risk
industries (Luo & Chung, 2005). Additionally, there is a higher
potential for path dependence in the learning and decision making of
family businesses because of the heavy employment of family
members. This characteristic sometimes leads to more incremental
changes and fewer risky decisions and strategies employed (Nordqvist,
2005). Thus, while family businesses have greater discretion allowing
them to take a longer term view, they may not do so because of the
risk often associated with these longer-term actions. Due to the
emotional link between family and firm, controlling families seek to
preserve existing capital and therefore to resist the creative
destruction that is inherent in the entrepreneurial process (Fogel,
2006; Morck, Strangeland, & Yeung, 2000; Morck & Yeung, 2003;
Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007 is consistent with this argument despite their
distinctions).
Just as family firms may be less entrepreneurial, they may also
be less adaptive. For example, it is rare for a family firm to engage in
downsizing or downscoping (Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998). Family
Entrepreneurship and Family Business (Advances in Entrepreneurship, Firm Emergence and Growth), Vol. 12 (2010): pg.
243-276. DOI. This article is © Emerald Group Publishing Ltd. and permission has been granted for this version to appear
in e-Publications@Marquette. Emerald Group Publishing Ltd. does not grant permission for this article to be further
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing Ltd.

11

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

members often are the primary managers of the major units in the
family firm and, thus, it is uncommon for those units to be closed, sold
off or outsourced. The family’s altruism also extends to long-time
employees and making downsizing decisions less attractive to family
businesses as well (Ram & Holliday, 1993). While the unwillingness to
harm loyal employees has advantages, it limits the flexibility of the
firm to make strategic readjustments as the competitive landscape
and/or economic environment change.
The second disadvantage, of conflicts between controlling and
minority shareholders (sometimes called the second agency problem),
does not necessarily follow from the owning family’s wish for control.
Rather, it follows from a desire to leverage family wealth, often tied up
in the firm, with outside investors’ equity. This can lead to the use of
mechanisms that create a “wedge” between their “control [and their]
sheer equity stake” (Villalonga & Amit, 2009: 3048). The most widely
used wedges are differential board membership, classes of stock with
differential voting rights, and chains of ownership (pyramids) that can
generate ultimate control well in excess of their equity stake.
Consequently the controlling owners can provide themselves cash and
salary benefits, “potentially biased related third-party transactions”
and other benefits at odds with the interests of minority shareholders
(Achmad et al., 2009: 42; also Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Andres, 2008;
Fogel, 2006; Morck, Strangeland, & Yeung, 2000; Morck & Yeung,
2003; Sciasia & Mazzola, 2008).
The family’s desire for control conflicts with “strict adherence to
wealth maximization” (Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2003: 264). If the
owning family’s control is entrenched – hard to discipline with market
forces – they face less favorable access to external equity markets as
well (Andres, 2008; Chua & Chrisman, 2004; Morck, Wolfenson, &
Yeung, 2005). Thus, this second agency problem results in discounted
valuations of the firm in the financial markets (Villalonga & Amit,
2009). Further, despite a lower cost of debt, family firms may be
reluctant to take a chance on default and only cautiously use debt to
leverage their equity (Allouche et al., 2008).
The family’s desire for control also leads to the third
disadvantage, weaker governance that tolerates weaker management.
Independent boards are correlated with higher firm performance but
obviously not with the independent discretion of the owning family. As
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a result, many family firms operate with weak governance
mechanisms, most obviously by means of boards with few outside
members and very few members who are truly independent of the
owners. These boards in turn are reluctant to question the owning
families’ decisions or actions (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; Lubatkin et al., 2005; Westhead &
Howorth, 2006). It is less common to see managers replaced,
particularly if they are members of the family or have strong linkages
to the family. As a result, ineffective managers may remain in
leadership positions much longer than they would in nonfamily
businesses (Gómez-Mejía, Núñez-Nickel & Gutierrez, 2001).
Weaker boards are also less inclined to question the succession
to leadership roles of less qualified members of the family (the fourth
disadvantage). Family businesses can therefore suffer from nepotism
(Schulze et al, 2001). They may fail to select individuals who have the
strongest human capital for key positions. This is almost inevitable
based on limiting the available talent pool to kin (Bennedsen et al.,
2007). Moreover, the controlling family may compound this problem
by failing to prepare their offspring to be competent, independent
adults rather than indulged children (Lubatkin et al., 2005; Ram &
Holliday, 1993; Song, 1999: 87). Financial markets apparently assume
that this outcome is most likely because they react to scions’
successions by discounting the shares (Morck & Yeung, 2003).
The fifth disadvantage follows from the preferential treatment of
family members and the reluctance to share control with non-family
members. The differentially favorable promotion and compensation of
family members, and the reluctance to share stock ownership, make it
difficult to promote and compensate non-kin appropriately. As a result,
family firms fail to take full advantage of external labor markets
(Chua, Chrisman, & Bergiel, 2009; Gedajlovic, Lubatkin, & Schulze,
2004).
The sixth disadvantage refers to the yin domain (Stewart,
2008): interpersonal conflicts. Not surprisingly, then, it received little
attention in this literature. It does not go unnoticed nonetheless. A
greater prevalence of conflict is proposed for relations between kin and
non-kin, and amongst kin, particularly over contested successions
(Lubatkin et al., 2005; Miller et al., 2009; Minichilli, Corbetta, &
MacMillan, 2010; Sciascia & Mazzola, 2008).
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Performance Effects of Family Involvement
What then is the net effect of the costs and benefits of kinship
involvement in business? Table One summarizes 32 empirical studies
that offer an answer in terms of the effect on firm performance. We
distinguish, as do the studies, between family involvement in
management (FIM) and family involvement in ownership (FIO), and
between accounting or operating measures (such as sales growth) and
financial market measures. Naturally the latter measures cannot be
used with privately held firms, which it will be seen represent a
minority of the samples despite being a majority of family firms.
Accordingly we also distinguish between studies with samples of
traded, public firms from those with non-traded, private firms, and
those with mixed samples. The sample for Bennedsen and colleagues
(2007) is mixed but must presumably be primarily private, considering
the large number of firms (5,334 that experienced a succession) within
a small country (Denmark). The sample for Minichilli, Corbetta and
MacMillan is 73% private (67/92)/

Table One

Performance effects for private firms
Distinguishing between public and private samples draws in
sharp relief the differences in performance effects. The broad brush
picture is clear. Family involvement has a positive effect for the public
firms and a negative effect for the private firms. For example, there
are five random samples of private firms. (These are marked with an
asterisk. Chrisman, Chua and Kellermanns (2009) used a random
sample of a convenience sample: SBDC clients.) In two of these
studies (Smith, 2008; Westhead & Howorth, 2006), family influence
has an insignificant or quite specific negative effect. In one sample
(Schulze et al., 2001), the negative effect is an opportunity cost
because the only positive effect is found in the absence of family
influence. In the other two studies (Jorissen et al., 2005 and Sciasia &
Mazzola, 2008), family influence has a significant negative effect. All
of these five studies considered both FIM and FIO, with the exception
of Jorissen and colleagues, which considered FIO. Further, the
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sophisticated large sample study by Bennedsen and colleagues (2007),
which used the random sex of the firstborn as an instrument for
succession, found significant negative effects of FIM. As previously
noted, we can assume that most firms in this sample were private.
Two of the findings of Minichilli and colleagues present puzzles for
future research. They found that private family firms outperform public
private firms. They also found a U shaped (not inverted U shaped)
effect of family involvement on performance, which they attribute to
diminishing and increasing schisms in families as more become
involved in management.

Performance effects for public firms
Empirical results are more complex for public family firms, with
several studies reporting non-linear effects and different results
depending on the level of family involvement. Several studies also
distinguish between the founding generation and succeeding heirs,
with the former outperforming the latter. In fact, Fogel (2006) and
Saito (2008) argue that the positive effects that have been found may
be driven by founders who are, after all, unusually successful having
taken their businesses public. That is, the positive results might better
be construed as entrepreneurial effects rather than family effects.
Lower performance for heirs than for non-descendents or founders was
found by several of the public sample studies (Anderson, Mansi &
Reeb, 2003; Andres, 2008; Morck, Strangeland & Yeung, 2000; PérezGonzález, 2006; Saito, 2008; Villalonga & Amit, 2006; for mixed
samples by Barth et al., 2005 and by Bennedsen et al., 2007; for
private samples by Barontoni & Caprio, 2006; Erhardt et al., 2005;
Saito, 2008).
However, in contrast with the findings for private firms, only one
of the studies (Achmad et al., 2009) found an overall negative effect,
and they found this in a low shareholder protection environment
(Indonesia). Moreover, 14 of the 18 studies found positive effects of
family involvement, given a variety of contingencies such as level of
control, generation, and HRM practices.

Practitioner Implication: Professionalize
An obvious implication of the negative effects of family for
private firms and positive effects for public firms is that family firms
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ought to professionalize their management and governance (as
recommended by Schulze et al., 2001; Sciascia & Mazzola, 2008;
Westhead & Howorth, 2006). Martínez, Stöhr, & Quiroga (2007: 93)
made the case as follows: “when family-controlled firms
professionalize their management and governance bodies, and have to
be accountable to minority shareholders, they can overcome most of
their traditional weaknesses and take advantage of their strengths and
succeed.”
This sanguine conclusion makes sense for several reasons. First,
it is consistent with a finding we can call the “Goldilocks” effect. There
is a level of family involvement in ownership and involvement in
management that is optimal: not too little and not too much. For
example, Sirmon, Arregle, Hitt and Webb (2008) argued that familyinfluenced firms (as opposed to family-controlled firms) tended to
achieve more positive outcomes. For example, the family influence
allows the positive attributes of a family to be infused into an
organization while having only a certain level of influence without
having control limits the potential negative effects of family
involvement. The research reported by Sirmon and colleagues (2008)
concluded that firms responding to competitive threats (e.g., imitating
their strategies) with higher investments in research and development
and with enhanced internationalization tended to perform at higher
levels than those who responded by curtailing R&D and
internationalization. They also found that firms having family influence
were more likely to respond with these strategic approaches than
nonfamily firms or family controlled firms. They also found that the
maximum performance was achieved when families held about 15
percent of the equity in a firm, which allowed them influence but did
not allow them control over the firm’s strategies and operations.
The precise levels for the optimum vary amongst the studies,
presumably due to different contexts and different definitions of
“family” involvement. However, a widespread finding is that
performance is highest with moderate to moderately high levels of
involvement (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Barth et al., 2005; Chahine,
2007; Maury, 2006; however, de Miguel et al., 2004 found instead a U
shaped curve). These are all studies with samples of public firms, with
the exception of the mixed sample by Barth and colleagues. For
private firms, of course, there cannot be a Goldilocks effect regarding
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involvement in ownership. Perhaps there could be one regarding
involvement in management, although in the private firm sample of
Sciascia and Mazzola (2008) the less the family involvement the
better. We cannot assume, though, that a hybrid of involvement by
family insiders and outsiders, or an “open family firm” (Colli, 2003) is
infeasible in private firms.
Second, the process of going public brings responsibility to
external shareholders and regulators, whose expectations and
procedures have become standardized through legal regimes and
socialization by business schools and the business media (Tsao et al.,
2009; Zhang & Ma, 2009). Third, family firms with boards independent
of the controlling family outperform those with boards beholden to the
family (Anderson & Reeb, 2004). Board independence is a
characteristic of professional governance. Fourth, firms with nonfamily successor CEOs significantly outperform firms with family
successor CEOs (Anderson, Mansi & Reeb, 2003; Barantoni & Caprio,
2006; Morck, Strangeland & Yeung, 2000; Pérez-González, 2006;
Saito, 2008; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). As Bennedsen and colleagues
(2007: 653) inferred, “professional CEOs [provide] extremely valuable
services.”
Transitioning to professional management entails more than
hiring non-family successors. More basic is developing a management
that is more “formalized, standardized, and… scientific” (Zhang and
Ma, 2009: 133). In short, the transition is one from yin to yang: from
amateurism to professionalism, informality to formality, secrecy to
openness, ascription to achievement, and subjectivity to objectivity.
Such a transition may not require our invocations as management
scholars; in many cultures it has been found to be the emergent,
unplanned consequence of coping with the challenges that firms face
as they grow (Berghoff, 2006; Goody, 1996: 143, 155; Kondo, 1990:
167ff., Marcus & Hall, 1992: 15-16; Trevinyo-Rodríguez, 2009; TsuiAuch, 2004; Zhang & Ma, 2009). The family firm might need to
professionalize as it faces the urging of governments and increased
needs for internal coordination, technological capabilities, outside
financing, and global competitive pressures (Tsui-Auch & Lee, 2003).
Pressures to professionalize emerge from the kinship end as well. As
Trevinyo-Rodríguez (2009) noted, the growth of the firm is linear but
the growth of the kindred is exponential.
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Many successful family firms do make the conscious decision to
professionalize, whether by hiring outside CEOs or educating the
succeeding generation in high quality business schools (Benedict,
1968; De Lima, 2000; Douglass 1992, 223, 225; Pérez-González,
2006; Tsui-Auch & Lee, 2003; Tsui-Auch, 2004). Those family firms
that professionalize may reap performance benefits. In one of the few
studies of HRM practices in family firms, Tsao and colleagues (2009)
found that family firms that adopted professional HRM practices
(termed High Performance Work Systems) outperformed non-family
firms, whereas those who did not do so underperformed non-family
firms. Despite these apparent advantages it is clear from the
performance of private family firms that many have failed to
professionalize. As Schulze and colleagues (2001: 111) suggested,
“there may be two types of family firms,” those who professionalize
and those that do not. Why might this be so?

Why Not Professionalize: Lack of Ability
One answer is that many family firms cannot professionalize.
This incapacity may result from cognitive, cultural, emotional, and
managerial causes. A fundamental cognitive impediment is that family
business managers can fail to see the need for change. Poza, Hanlon
and Kishida (2004) found that the perceptions of family firm CEOs and
parents, were significantly more sanguine regarding their management
than were other family and non-family managers. Moreover, family
member CEOs tend to be longer-tenured and less well educated than
non-family CEOs (Bennedsen et al., 2007; Jorissen et al., 2005; PérezGonzález, 2006). These CEOs might believe that they are doing all
they can to keep up with change and simply cannot learn any faster
(Zahra & Filatotchev, 2004). Curiously, however, Tsui-Auch’s (2004)
study of professionalization among Chinese family firms in Singapore
found no correlation with educational levels.
Cultural impediments include the norms of kinship systems that
are at odds with purely economic rationality. A classic problem for
entrepreneurs who look to grow their ventures has been called the
challenge of disembedding (Stewart, 1990). Their need to channel
resources into their business conflicts with the obligations that flow
from the webs of kinship within which they and their firms are
embedded. In many cultures they are expected to make displays of
their wealth and to redistribute it generously amongst their kindred.
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Failure to do so leads to intra- personal and inter-personal conflicts
(Davidoff & Hall, 1987: 216; Hart, 1975; Marcus with Hall, 1992:
Chap. 4; Watson, 1985: 163). Further, entrepreneurs might seek to
include or exclude family members from responsible positions based
largely on capabilities. In most kinship systems they enjoy
considerable latitude, but if they prioritize family membership less than
expected given the norms of their culture, emotionally painful conflict
is likely to follow (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; Hamabata, 1990).
As this example suggests, cultural impediments are linked with
emotional impediments. Culture includes expectations about emotions,
and as components of culture so to does a kinship system. Individuals
often experience ambivalence about their expected feelings, but this
ambivalence only serves to give evidence that they have internalized
the expectations (Peletz, 2001). We have noted a central source of
ambivalence for family business owners: parents’ recognition that they
should develop independence in their children but feeling a temptation
to spoil them. Similarly, siblings might recognize the need to promote
the most capable scion but still find it hard not to view their own
offspring as more capable than their nieces and nephews (Forden,
2001; Tsui-Auch, 2004). The psychological concept used in the family
business literature to describe this conundrum is “parental altruism”
(Lubatkin, Schulze & Ling, 2005). In Japanese culture, a similar
concept that is widely discussed and considered endemic in family
firms is the indulgence of passive love; in Japanese, amayakasu for
the giving of indulgence (amae is the noun; Kondo, 1990: 150; the
classic account is Doi, 1973; a recent comparison with British terms is
Lewis and Ozaki, 2009). This problem of indulging family members can
extend to non-family employees as well as family members thanks to
ideologies of the workplace as a “family” (Ram & Holliday, 1993;
Smith, 2009).
Emotional and cultural entanglements such as these make it
impossible to professionalize a family firm simply by recruiting nonfamily managers. Being a “professional” manager in a family firm
requires the capacity to navigate through idiosyncratic family cultures
(Hall & Nordqvist, 2008; Lee, Lim & Lim, 2003). Nor can the family
firm operate just as if it were a non-family firm. Professionalizing HRM
practices, for example, requires consideration for the firm’s noneconomic goals, long time horizons, and desire to maintain control
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over the generations, all of which militate against shorter-term or
stock-based incentives (Chua, Chrisman, & Bergiel, 2009; Gedajlovic,
Lubatkin, & Schulze, 2004). Efforts to import current HRM practices
without consideration of the family context can be lead to conflict
(Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; Hall & Nordqvist, 2008). Similarly, pay
dispersion in the top management team correlates with significantly
higher growth in non-family firms but significantly lower growth in
family firms (Ensley, Pearson, & Sardeshmukh, 2007; also Schulze et
al., 2001). For these reasons, family firms can find it difficult to
attract, reward and retain high quality “professional” managers
(Barnett & Kellermanns, 2006; Beehr, Drexler, & Faulkner, S., 1997;
Stewart, 2003).

Why Not Professionalize: Lack of Desire
Family CEOs could, of course, prefer to maintain the cultures
and emotional orders of their firms, however non-professional we
academics might consider them. Moreover, they might view
professional management as a threat to five of the benefits that they
currently enjoy: discretionary use of cash flows, maintenance of noneconomic benefits, unique access to resources found uniquely in the
kinship domain, and secrecy. The first of these benefits applies equally
to other closely held, private firms and does not explain the apparently
lower accounting and operating performance of family firms. The same
desire to reduce taxes and hence reported income applies equally to
their comparison firms. However, family firm CEOs might have a
different set of preferences than non-family firm CEOs (Astrachan &
Jaskiewicz, 2008; Chrisman et al., 2010). They might prefer, as
Gómez-Mejía and colleagues put it, to preserve their “socioeconomic
wealth” rather than maximize their financial wealth. For example, only
the former might have a preference for finding employment for
relatives, or for maintaining a long- standing company name that
provides prestige for the family (Berghoff, 2006; Erhardt, Nowak, &
Weber, 2005). Moreover, the “tunneling” of wealth from the firm to
the owners’ coffers could be more prevalent in family-controlled than
in other closely held firms (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; Lomnitz & PérezLizaur, 1987: 13, 105; 116-117). Consequently the apparently lower
performance of family firms might not be construed as such by these
CEOs (Pérez-González, 2006).
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Professionalizing management could also be seen as a threat to
the current CEOs’ power, especially if these CEOs are, as often, less
well educated than their peers (Zahra & Filatotchev, 2004). They
could see a threat to their unique access to familial resources. As
Greenhalgh (1994: 751) expressed it regarding a Taiwanese “family
head,” embeddedness in and manipulation of kinship traditions
enabled him to “build his firm out of the loyalties and talents of his
family.” This capacity must seem to be worth keeping. Finally,
professional management could be seen as valuing openness and
disclosure in contrast with reticence and secrecy (Gedajlovic, Lubatkin,
& Schulze, 2004; Greenhalgh, 1994; Stewart, 2003). This too could
seem to be threatening. On balance, then, the family firm may choose
to retain its “traditional” methods, particularly in functions related to
control over privileged access to resources such as cash flows and
executive positions. Therefore we would expect that the most likely
areas of conflict in efforts to professionalize are financial and HR
strategy, and governance.

Why Not Professionalize: Lack of a Need
Professionalizing might not be possible and it might not be
desired. It might also not be needed. The firm’s situation might not
require the transition. “Cultural and institutional factors” such as the
need to professionalize, so as to appear legitimate for outsiders, might
not as yet be salient (Tsui-Auch, 2004: 713). The prevailing
managerial culture might also be unsympathetic to the transition
(Whyte, 1996; Zhang & Ma, 2009). The competitive environment
might not require changes if niches are small, markets fragmented,
and environments dynamic (Gedajlovic, Lubatkin, & Schulze, 2004).
In such cases the firm will also not experience internal pressures for
professionalizing so as to deal with increasing scale, R&D intensity, or
marketing sophistication (Lin & Hu, 2007).
These arguments have assumed that firms “fail” to
professionalize, rather than stick wisely to their course. We should
reflect on this. Have we assumed the validity of Structural Dualism
Three, the managerial variant of yin-yang ideology? Have we
undersold the value for business of such yin qualities as informality,
nurturance, and subjectivity? Qualities such as these offer
opportunities for deploying resources from the yin domain, where they
generate low profits, to the yang domain where they generate
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competitive advantage (following Barth, 1967). Further, the
assumption that a category called “family firms” should be subsumed
under yin may be misleading, for three reasons. First, it might be
based on inadequate or faulty observations. Second, while yin qualities
might characterize some family firms they might not for others.
“Family firms” are homogenous (Colli, 2003; Croutsche & Ganidis,
2008; Lin & Hu, 2007). Third, we cannot assume that all the yin
qualities more strongly correlate with one another rather than with
yang, and vice versa; that is, we ought not to draw “vertical”
inferences from the dualisms (Rutherford, 2010). Doing so, as Graham
(1989: 338) has argued, is an error typical of “protoscientific”
thinking.
We need moreover to be cautious in our assumptions about the
meaning of professional management in family firms. As Hall and
Nordqvist (2008) have argued, the professional manager in the family
firm has to be astute regarding both yin and yang, to return to our
metaphor. For this reason, it could be misleading to argue that
succession by heirs gives evidence of drawing on a limited talent pool,
because the talent of value might be idiosyncratic. We need therefore
to be cautious in equating non-family CEO successions with a
professional transition (as with Bennedsen et al., 2007; Lin & Hu,
2007; Zhang & Ma, 2009). Non-family CEOs might be amateurs just as
family managers might be professionals (Hall & Nordqvist, 2008).
We should also recall the thesis from agency theory that
introducing non-family managers introduces conflicts of interest
between the owners and their agents, the managers (Chua, Chrisman,
& Bergiel, 2009; Lee, Lim, & Lim, 2003). Introducing these managers
also introduces what Leonard Sayles disparaged as “Generally
Accepted Management Principles (GAMP)”, which looks to solve
ongoing coordination challenges by means of command and control.
Observational studies over several decades have shown that this
abstract, yang-oriented approach fails whereas “work flow
entrepreneurship” by lower level employees succeeds (Sayles &
Stewart, 1995; Smith, 2009: 81-86). Further, the evidence favoring
professional” management in entrepreneurial ventures is weak.
Willard, Krueger and Feeser (1992) failed to find evidence that
professionally managed high growth ventures outperformed foundermanaged high growth ventures. On balance, we should be cautious
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about equating family firms with amateurism and non-family firms
with professionalism.

Cause for Caution: Limitations in Current
Knowledge
Practitioners, were they to examine empirical research on family
firm performance, might not be inclined to draw any managerial
implications. The studies are carefully crafted and many are clever.
However, they are not without serious limitations. We have noted the
skewing to public firms. Absent a theoretical interest in public family
firms as such – which is rare – this amounts to biased convenience
sampling (Combs, 2008; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999;
Morck & Yeung, 2003; Schulze & Gedajlovic, 2010). Only five studies
are based on random samples of private firms; clearly more are
needed (Chrisman et al., 2010).
Naturally enough, performance studies exhibit the usual
tradeoffs of survey research. For example, this research is
overwhelmingly cross-sectional (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; there are
exceptions such as Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). However, changes in
family systems have major impacts on family firms (Aldrich & Cliff,
2003; Greenhalgh, 1994; Whyte, 1996), and families and households
are systematically misrepresented without attention to the domestic
life cycle (Goody, 1996; Harrell, 1997; Robertson, 1991). For family
firm entrepreneurs, knowledge of when kinship is a resource requires a
keen attention to timing and kinship dynamics (Aldrich & Cliff, 2003;
Stewart, 1990).
Survey research such as these studies gives up contextual depth
in favor of generalizability. Yet for practitioners, context is everything:
just when it is that connections from the yin domain are a resource, a
hindrance or irrelevant is entirely situational (Wallman, 1975; also
Astrachan & Jaskiewicz, 2008; Harrell, 1997: 36; Sahlins, 1972: 198199). This research does attend to certain contexts such as countries,
albeit with yang-oriented concerns such as shareholder protection
regulations (Allouche et al., 2008; Fogel, 2006; Khanna & Yafeh,
2007; Smith, 2008). However, as others have noted, we need more
research on “family-related differences [such as] variations in
inheritance structures or marriage norms” Bertrand and Schoar, 2006:
94; also Khanna & Yafeh, 2007). Very little attention is paid in these
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performance studies to country histories (Church, 1993) or societal
factors that particularly impact family structures (Jones, 2005).
Examples of such factors are the socialization of reproduction
(Robertson, 1991: 128) and the legal regimes as they affect family
firms. For example, the “distinction [that] is often made between
ancestral and self-acquired property” (Goody, 1997: 455) has
profound implications for power relations and conflicts in Chinese
family firms (for the example of Chinese family firms,
Greenhalgh,1994; for conflicts therein Oxfeld 1993: 191-196). With
some exceptions (e.g., Jorissen et al., 2005), this research also pays
little attention to individual or demographic variables, which are
important for understanding family firms (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006;
Danes, Stafford & Loy, 2007). Most strikingly, only two of the studies,
and none of the five random sample private firm studies, have any
data at all on kinship itself. The family is treated as a “’black box’”
(Creed, 2000: 346). The studies also dichotomize their samples into
family and non-family firms in various ways, whereas the “degree…
and mode” of kinship involvement is not “an either-or scenario”
(Sharma, 2004: 4).
Survey research tends to have the sorts of limitations we have
noted. It cannot be expected to examine the subtle realities of
management. Unfortunately, qualitative researchers, who could
contribute to this puzzle, have little to offer on the inner workings of
family firms. Sorely lacking from our literature are extensive, in-depth
studies by social scientists on kinship and business within particular
firms (Nordqvist, Hall, & Melin, 2009). We know of no studies
comparable to studies of non-family business such classics as Bower
(1970), Dalton (1959), Gouldner (1951), and Pettigrew (1986). It is
true that there are useful journalistic books on business families,
especially prominent ones such as the Bronfmans (Faith, 2006),
Dasslers (Smit, 2008), Guccis (Forden, 2001) and Guggenheims
(Unger & Unger, 2005). It is also true that historical studies can be
helpful, such as Fruin (1983) on the “Kikkoman company, clan and
community” and Watson (1985) on the Teng lineage of Ha Tsuen in
southern China.
Monograph-length ethnographies of family firms, however, are
notable for their absence. Perhaps these will begin to appear as the
family business field emerges; perhaps doctoral students are working
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on family firm ethnographies as we write this. If so, they might also be
capable and interested in the study of both the yin and yang domains
and of the interplay between them. One likely reason for the dearth of
such studies, however, is likely to remain. Access into the field is a
challenge for organizational ethnography of any description. Family
firm access is more challenging yet. Gatekeepers of these firms are
accustomed to privacy and may well be concerned that sensitive family
matters might be publicized should they grant researchers up-close,
long-term access to their domains. Opportunistic use of pre-existing
connections such as consultancy roles may prove to be necessary, as it
was also for Dalton, Gouldner, Pettigrew and other organizational
ethnographers.2 Bower’s access, by contrast, was gained through
“time and care” (personal communication), although it surely helped,
as with Hamabata (1990), to have an elite affiliation (Harvard
University).
Near exceptions to the dearth of in-depth field studies include
two books about Japanese family businesses by Japanese-American
scholars, Hamabata (1990) and Kondo (1990). Each is well worth
reading by family business scholars but neither has a great deal to say
about business as such. Their focus – Hamabata’s especially – is on yin
not yang. Both these books demonstrate that there can be much of
value for family business scholars from studies that look at the
business side from the family side, rather than the reverse. These
books and other, familial oriented studies such as Davidoff and Hall
(1987), Douglass (1992), Hamilton (2006), Smith (2009), and Zwick
(2004), reveal complex “set[s] of mutual connections” between
“market [and] family” (Davidoff & Hall, 1987: 32). Typically they find
important roles of women who, with apparently only private, domestic
roles, influence public affairs, often through networks of other women
(Davidoff & Hall, 1987: 202, 227; also Bruun, 1993: 22; di Leonardo,
1987; Lomnitz & Pérez-Lizaur, 1987: 118; Robertson, 1991: 41;
Rotman, 2006). Hamabata, for example, found that very wealthy
Japanese women conducted transactions through their natal kin; this
is unexpected in a strongly patrilocal society (1990: 28). However,
these studies fail to pursue the kinship-business connection very far at
all into the business domain.

2

Jenny Helin is currently doing just this for her dissertation at Jönköping International Business
School.
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In this they reflect an unfortunate division of scholarly labor.
Yin-oriented scholars have shown little interest in the yang. As Plath
has lamented, in his review of Kondo’s work, “research on family…
[has been] intellectually ghettoed from research on work or industrial
organization” (1991: 417; also Aldrich & Cliff, 2003; Smith, 2009: 811). Yang-oriented scholars have, for their part, marginalized yinoriented subjects such as family firms – at least the family firm
aspects of these firms (Jones, 2005; Stewart, 2008). Because of this
disjunction, our knowledge base is limited. We know that most firms
are profoundly embedded in kinship and marriage. We know that yin
and yang have complex inter-connections (Creed, 2000; Schwass,
2005; Smith, 2009). We have reason to consider these connections to
be, on balance, complementary. We have reason to think that the
management of “the overlap between the family and the business” is
crucial for family firm performance (Olson et al., 2003: 661; Sharma,
2004). However, we know little of the situational logics or the
strategizing of managers, the human agents who navigate the
boundaries of the yin and the yang. In just what ways, in what
situations, do family business entrepreneurs profit from bridging the
domains? We await the answers. Until such time as we gain a deeper
grasp of these questions we ought to be cautious about prescribing the
best course of action for particular family firms.
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Table 1. Summary of Empirical Studies of the Effect of Family Involvement
on Firm Performance.

* random sample. Chrisman et al. 2009 is a random sample of a convenience
sample (SBDC clients).
** "This means that performance decreases as FIM increases, and the
decrease is more noticeable at higher levels of FIM" (p. 340).
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